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CASES NOTED
Antitrust Violation as a Defense to Breach of
Contract: An Expanded Policy Analysis
The Second Circuit, in the noted case, delineated the policy
considerations in deciding whether to permit an antitrust defense
in a contract action. These considerations are: whether enforce-
ment would result in unjust enrichment; whether enforcement
would aid and abet the alleged antitrust violation, and; whether
the defense would complicate the action. The author contends
that the court misapplied the policies set forth on the facts
therein for there can be no unjust enrichment where an executory
contract is in question; there is an aiding and abetting of a Sher-
man Act violation by enforcing the contract; and there is no
complication of the contract action because the alleged violation
is apparently susceptible to ready proof. Upon reaching this con-
clusion the author contends the antitrust defense should be avail-
able against the third party assignee.
Viacom International, Inc. brought an action against Tandem
Productions, Inc., producer of the popular television show, "All in
the Family," for declaration of its rights as assignee' of an exclusive
license to distribute and syndicate' the television program pursuant
to an agreement between Tandem and the Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc. (CBS). 3 In defense, Tandem asserted that CBS could
not validly assign the distribution and syndication rights to Via-
com, 4 and furthermore, that the contract violated federal antitrust
1. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS) obtained the Federal Communications
Commission's (FCC) approval to merge CBS Enterprises, Inc., a subsidiary of CBS which
handled the distribution and syndication of television programs, into Viacom through a spin-
off transaction whose stock was thereby distributed to the CBS stockholders pursuant to the
FCC's directions. In re Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 30 F.C.C.2d 9, aff'd sub nom. lacopi
v. F.C.C., 451 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1971). CBS then assigned all rights it owned to distribute
and syndicate television shows to Viacom.
2. The distribution and syndication business is: (a) domestic rerun distribution of pro-
grams after their network run is completed and, (b) the foreign distribution at the same time
as the network broadcast. Viacom Int'l Inc. v. Tandem Productions, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1264
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
3. The district court determined that Tandem and CBS formed a binding oral agreement
as of July 10, 1970, in which Tandem granted broadcast, distribution, and syndication rights
of "All in the Family" to CBS. Id. at 1269.
4. Tandem argued that the oral agreement did not include the right to assign. However,
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law,5 thereby making it unenforceable.' Tandem alleged that it was
coerced into a "tie-in" 7 of the distribution and syndication rights to
broadcasting rights, an arrangement which is illegal under Section
1 of the Sherman Act.' Tandem contended this Section 1 violation
would preclude Viacom, CBS's assignee, from maintaining the ac-
tion. Viacom argued that the tying arrangement was "inherently
legal" and that the contract constituted an "intelligible economic
transaction." 9 Tandem warned that the court's "enforcing the con-
tract would aid and abet the precise conduct made unlawful by the
Sherman Act."'" The district court, upholding the assignment, en-
joined Tandem from selling the rights to another and found that the
contract was not subject to the defense that it was in violation of
the antitrust laws." The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held, affirmed: A defendant is precluded from interposing the ille-
gality of a contract under the antitrust laws as a defense to an action
on a contract where the plaintiff, who would suffer unjustly by the
prolonged determination of the defense, was not a party to the ille-
an assignment clause was added to the final written agreement as a boilerplate clause.
Tandem objected to the assignment clause, but CBS refused to omit it. Tandem finally signed
the contract in Spring 1971 telling CBS that it had reservations whether CBS could validly
assign the rights. The district court, having found a meeting of the minds under the oral
agreement, declared this clause was not material, and therefore it was valid and effective as
of July 10, 1970, the date of the oral agreement. Id. at 1272-73.
5. Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act provides: "Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal .. "15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. IV, 1974).
6. "A party to an illegal bargain can[not] . . . recover damages for breach thereof
."RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 598 (1932). For exceptions, see Id. at §§ 599-609.
7. A tying arrangement is "an agreement by a party to sell [or buy] one product but
only on the condition that the buyer [or seller] also purchases [or sells] a different (or tied)
product..." Northern P. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). See generally Baldwin
and McFarland, Tying Arrangements in Law and Economics, 8 ANTITRUST BULL. 743 (1963).
8. "[T]ying arrangements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competi-
tion." Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305 (1949). "[Tying
arrangements] are unreasonable in and of themselves whenever a party has sufficient eco-
nomic power with respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free competition in the
market for the tied product ... " Northern P. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6. See Black
v. Magnolia Liquor Co., Inc., 355 U.S. 24, 25 (1957); Associated Press v. Taft.-Ingalls Corp.,
340 F.2d 753 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 820 (1965); cf. Solomon, An Analysis of Tying
Arrangements: The Offer You Can't Refuse, 26 MERCER L. REV. 547 (1975). But see Pearson,
Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Policy, 60 Nw. U. L. REV. 626 (1965).
9. Viacom Int'l Inc. v. Tandem Productions, Inc., 526 F.2d 593, 598 (2d Cir. 1975). See
Kelly v. Kosuga 358 U.S. 516, 521 (1959).
10. 526 F.2d at 598. See Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons Co., 212
U.S. 227, 261-62 (1909) ("Court will not lend its aid" to an illegal agreement).
11. Viacom Int'l Inc. v. Tandem Productions, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1264 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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gality. Viacom International, Inc. v. Tandem Productions, Inc., 526
F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1975).
It is a well-settled rule in contract law that an illegal contract
will not be enforced by the courts. 2 As with other rules of law, there
are exceptions. The exception considered in Viacom is the alleged
violation of the federal antitrust laws.
. Generally, the acceptance of the defense of antitrust illegality
has been at the rather arbitrary mercy of the courts. 3 The courts
have done little but give lip service to two overriding policy consid-
erations. The first consideration is whether either of the parties
would be unjustly enriched by upholding or dismissing the defense.
The second involves a determination of whether dismissal of the
defense would make the court a party to the illegality. Instead, the
courts have capriciously applied artificial standards,' which look to
see if the agreement in violation is "collateral,"' 5 "severable,"'
"inherently or intrinsically legal"" or "an intelligible economic
12. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 598 (1932).
13. Since the enactment of the Sherman Act in 1890, the United States Supreme Court
has in general not acted favorably toward the use of antitrust violations as a defense in breach
of contract actions. The Court has ruled on the defense eight times. It has upheld the defense
twice. Boston Store v. American Graphophone Co., 246 U.S. 8 (1918); Continental Wall Paper
Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons Co., 212 U.S. 227 (1909). It has dismissed the defense six times.
Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516 (1959); Bruce's Juices, Inc., v. American Can Co., 330 U.S.
743 (1947); A.B. Small Co. v. Lamborn & Co., 267 U.S. 248 (1925); D.R. Wilder Mfg. Co. v.
Corn Products Refining Co., 236 U.S. 165 (1915); Cincinnati Packet Co. v. Bay, 200 U.S. 179
(1906); Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540 (1902).
Although the last Supreme Court case to uphold the defense was decided in 1918, judicial
recognition of the availability of the defense can be found more recently. Justice Harlan, in
a proceeding on an application for a stay pending certiorari stated:
The claim that the contract in suit entailed a federally illegal "tying arrange-
ment" cannot be regarded as lacking in substance .. .and does not appear to
be precisely controlled by any decision of this Court. The posture of federal law
relating to the availability of the asserted antitrust defense in this contract action
is to say the least highly debatable.
American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc., 87 S. Ct.
1, 2 (1966) (mem.).
For an in depth historical survey of the courts' disposition towards the antitrust defense
see Lockhart, Violation of Anti-trust Laws as a Defense in Civil Actions, 31 MINN. L. REV.
507 (1947).
14. The courts' reasons for dismissing the defense have been tenuous in order to preserve
the equities they perceived, and at the same time to prevent criticism that they were enforcing
the alleged illegality. See, e.g., Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516, 520-21 (1959); Connolly v.
Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540, 549 (1902). See generally Lockhart supra note 13.
15. Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540, 549 (1902).
16. Id.; Cincinnati Packet Co. v. Bay, 200 U.S. 179, 185 (1906).
17. D.R. Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Corn Products Refining Co., 236 U.S. 165, 177 (1915); see
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transaction in itself."' 8 Other courts have stated that the antitrust
laws provide for exclusive remedies. 9 These practices have served
to facilitate the courts' dismissal of the defense, but have not ade-
quately resolved the real conflict between the policy considerations.
Furthermore, they have failed to provide for consistent and equita-
ble results.
For example, in Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co.,20 an action
to recover on promissory notes given for the purchase of pipe, the
Supreme Court rejected the antitrust defense, which alleged that
unreasonable prices were fixed by a combination of competitors
including plaintiff, and employed the "collateral-severable" stan-
dard, stating:
The contracts between the plaintiff and the respective defen-
dants were, in every sense, collateral to the alleged agreement
between the plaintiff and other corporations whereby an illegal
combination was formed for the sale of. . . pipe. 21
Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons Co.,22 one of two
Supreme Court decisions 3 upholding the defense, recognized that
the contract was part of an overall illegal scheme with the effect of
Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons Co., 212 U.S. 227, 261 (1909) (overall
illegal scheme).
18. Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516, 521 (1959).
19. Chief Justice White, in what appears to be an effort to bury the antitrust defense in
D. R. Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Corn Products Refining Co., supra note 17, stated that remedies
provided by the antitrust laws were exclusive and the responsibility of enforcing its provisions
were expressly cast upon the Attorney General. 236 U.S. 165, 173-75 (1915). However, the
Chief Justice ignored Section 4 of the Clayton Act, passed 5 months prior to the Wilder
decision, which authorized private lawsuits by anyone injured by conduct in violation of the
antitrust laws. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
Nevertheless, 10 years later, the Court in A. B. Small v. Lamborn & Co., supra note 13,
held that "it is only where the invalidity is inherent in the contract that the [Sherman]
[Alct may be interposed as a defense. With that exception the remedies which the act
provides for violations of it are exclusive." 267 U.S. 248, 252 (1925); cf. Bruce's Juices, Inc.
v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743 (1947) (remedies provided by the Robinson-Patman Act
are exclusive). But see id. at 758-61 (Murphy, J., dissenting, with Black, Douglas & Rutledge,
JJ., joining in dissent); United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 51 (1962); Tampa Elec.
Co. v, Nashville Coal Co., 276 F.2d 766, 783-84 (6th Cir. 1960) (Weick, J., dissenting). See
also Lockhart, supra note 13, at 570 (present antitrust sanctions are inadequate); Fifty Years
of Sherman Act Enforcement 49 YALE L. J. 284, 298 (1939-40).
20. 184 U.S. 540 (1902).
21. Id. at 549.
22. 212 U.S. 227 (1909).
23. The other decision is Boston Store v. American Graphophone Co., 246 U.S. 8 (1918).
Here an illegal resale price maintenance contract was held illegal on its face. Therefore, the
Court refused to enjoin defendant's violation of the agremement.
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restraining trade and commerce. Therefore, the Court refused to
become a party to the illegality by enforcing the agreement. '4
Viacom is significant in that the court of appeals explicitly
acknowledged that such standards are "too imprecise" 5 and recog-
nized the arbitrary discretion they give to the courts:
Whether a court classifies [an agreement] as an "intelligible
economic transaction in itself' or as "part of . . any general
plan or scheme that the law condemned;" [citing Continental],
may well depend on how much of the circumstances surrounding
the [agreement] the court is willing to consider. Similarly, a
determination of whether a contract . . . is "inherently invalid"
may depend on the court's perception of the contract as a sepa-
rate or "collateral" entity or as an integral part of an attempt to
stifle competition, enforcement of which would effectuate "the
precise conduct made unlawful" . . . .While application of the
doctrine of severability . . . is a possibility, it would be difficult
to prove that a finding that the two agreements [referring to
illegal tying arrangement] were integrally related was clearly
erroneous.
26
Viacom shifts the emphasis to a consideration and balancing of
three competing policy issues and their relation to an independent
assignee of the agreement in question: (1) the policy of preventing
unjust enrichment;" (2) the policy of prohibiting the courts from
aiding and abetting the antitrust violations; and (3) the policy of
keeping simple contract actions simple. 8
24. Continental involved an action to recover the purchase price on goods sold and
delivered. The Court, in sustaining the antitrust defense, reasoned
that a court will not lend its aid, in any way, to a party seeking to realize the fruits
of an agreement that appears to be tainted with illegality, although the result of
applying that rule may sometimes be to shield one who has got something for
which, as between man and man, he ought, perhaps, to pay, but for which he is
unwilling to pay.
212 U.S. 227, 262. See Farbenfabriken Bayer, A.G. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 307 F.2d 207 (3d
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 929 (1963).
The Court in Kelly v. Kosuga limited Continental to its facts, finding that the defense
would be upheld only when the contract was inherently illegal, the enforcement of which
would make the courts a party to the carrying out of the restraints forbidden by the Sherman
Act. 358 U.S. 516, 520 (1959).
25. 526 F.2d at 598.
26. Id. (footnote omitted).
27. Id. at 599.
28. Id. at 599-600. See Dickstein v. duPont, 443 F.2d 783 (1st Cir. 1971). See generally
Sobel, Antitrust Defenses to Contract Actions: A Question of Policy Priorities, 16 ANTITRUST
BULL. 455 (1971).
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Unjust enrichment is a valid concern of the courts. If the defen-
dant refuses to pay for goods delivered" or services performed,30
claiming illegal price fixing as a defense, he would in fact be getting
something for nothing if the defense were upheld. Justice Holmes,
dissenting in Continental put it quite succinctly when he advocated
the principle of "preventing people from getting other people's prop-
erty for nothing when they purport to be buying it.""1
Generally, where the contracts have been executed, the courts
have had no problem in weighing the equities in favor of the plain-
tiff," but where the contracts were executory, the majority of cases
have upheld the defense." Neither party could claim the other had
received something for nothing.
The court in Viacom, guided by the major and most recent
Supreme Court decision to rule on the antitrust defense, Kelly v.
Kosuga, 4 examined Tandem's claim "that its arrangement with
Viacom present[ed] no possibility of unjust enrichment because no
distribution or syndication of 'All in the Family' [had] yet occurred
and Tandem [had] received no payments for these services.""
Tandem had raised a valid argument-the contract was still execu-
tory and therefore a finding that the contract was invalid could not
unjustly enrich them. Furthermore, if the court were to uphold the
contract, it would be forcing the parties to carry out the illegality
in the future, thereby aiding and abetting the violation of the Sher-
man Act."
29. See, e.g., Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516 (1959).
30. See, e.g., Lewis v. Seanor Coal Co., 382 F.2d 437 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 947 (1968).
31. 212 U.S. 227, 271 (1909) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Generally, the courts have had great difficulty applying this principle, for they have too
often forgotten that the plaintiff may be unjustly enriched as well if the defense is not
sustained and the contract has not yet been executed.
32. See, e.g., Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516 (1959); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Malco
Petroleum, Inc., 471 F.2d 1258 (6th Cir. 1972); Lewis v. Seanor Coal Co., 382 F.2d 437 (3d
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 947 (1968).
33. See, e.g., Associated Press v. Taft-Ingalls Corp., 340 F.2d 753 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 820 (1965); Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 276 F.2d 766 (6th Cir. 1960),
rev'd on other grounds, 365 U.S. 320 (1961); Revlon, Inc. v. Williams Int'l, Inc., 214 N.Y.S.2d
456 (1961). See also note 37 infra.
34. 358 U.S. 516 (1959). In ruling on the antitrust defense in an action to recover the
purchase price on delivered goods, the Court held that "[plast the point here the judgment
of the Court would itself be enforcing the precise conduct made unlawful by the [Sherman]
Act, the courts are to be guided by the overriding general policy [of preventing the unjust
enrichment of the defendant]." Id. at 520-21.
35. 526 F.2d at 599.
36. See note 14 supra and cases cited note 33 supra.
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Unpersuaded by the decision in Associated Press v. Taft-Ingalls
Corp.,'" which allowed the defendant to prove that the contract it
had breached was an illegal tying arrangement, and which refused
to enforce the contract which required payment for unwanted future
services from plaintiff, the court in Viacom recognized that even if
the distribution and syndication license was executory, Tandem
may still obtain unjust enrichment by continuing to receive higher
fees for the broadcast rights. 8 On the basis of the district court's
findings, however, it was questionable whether the amount of pay-
ments for the broadcast rights reflected the fact that CBS was also
receiving the distribution and syndication rights.39
Even if the consideration for the broadcasting rights had been
adjusted to include some compensation for the distribution and
syndication rights, the court of appeals failed to adequately consider
the coercive nature of this tying arrangement 0 and the objections
that Tandem had made to the tying arrangement and assignment
of rights to Viacom. An analysis of these factors may show that it
was the plaintiff and CBS who were unjustly enriched, for it was
they who took advantage of their own anticompetitive economic
power.
Tandem, during contract negotiations with CBS, unsuccess-
fully sought to retain the syndication rights. CBS, one of three na-
tional networks, had sufficient economic power4' over the tying
product (broadcasting during prime time), to coerce Tandem to
37. 340 F.2d 753 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 820 (1965); accord, Atlantic Richfield
Co. v. Malco Petroleum, Inc., 471 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (6th Cir. 1972) (distinguishing
Associated Press on ground that Associated Press involved an executory contract and Atlantic
Richfield involved an executed contract).
38. 526 F.2d at 599.
39. The district court determined that the consideration for the broadcast rights was
separate from the consideration for the distribution and syndication rights. Viacom Int'l Inc.
v. Tandem Productions, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1264, 1277 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
40. "[AIll tying arrangements are . . . nothing more than the naked application of
coercion." Solomon, An Analysis of Tying Arrangements: The Offer You Can't Refuse, 26
MERCER L. REV. 547, 548 (1975). "Tying arrangements are abhorred by the courts primarily
because they foreclose a substantial quantity of business to competitors and extend preexist-
ing economic power to new markets for no good justification." American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co.
v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc., 446 F.2d 1131, 1137 (2d Cir. 1971). See
note 10 supra.
41. Sufficient economic power is required to establish an illegal tying arrangement.
Uniqueness may establish sufficient economic power. Television programs have been found
to be of a unique nature sufficient to give one of the three major networks leverage to gain
power over the tying product. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Broadcasting-
Paramount Theatres, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 848, 850 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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include the distribution and syndication rights if Tandem wanted
the program to have access to prime time television. 2 Tandem was
thereby restrained from selling the rights in the open market. 3
This monopoly power inherent in the major networks44 has been
expressly recognized by the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC), but since the FCC has no jurisdiction to impose sanctions
for antitrust violations, it promulgated the "financial interest rule,"
on May 4, 1970 to prevent such tying arrangements. 5 Viacom was
fortunate that the effective date of the "financial interest rule" was
delayed until July 23, 1971 by actions by the networks challenging
the rule, " otherwise Viacom would have had no recourse. 7
It may be argued that Tandem was subjected to further
coercion when unduly required to accept the assignment of rights
to Viacom." The court of appeals did not view this as additional
42. Prime time television is virtually the only economically profitable market for televi-
sion comedy entertainment programs. Viacom Int'l Inc. v. Tandem Productions, Inc., 368 F.
Supp. 1264, 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
43. The court in Associated Press recognized that: "One of the evils inherent in any tying
arrangement is that it forces the buyer [or seller] to give up his independent judgment as to
whether, or where, to purchase [or sell] the tied product." 340 F.2d at 762.
44. The great majority of television shows are produced by independent producers, like
Tandem. They are then sold to one of the three major networks who control access to the
broadcasting. In 1964, these networks produced 19.8 percent of prime time programs, yet
obtained syndication and distribution interest in 75.7 percent of all programs televised that
year. Similarly, CBS, in 1968, produced 17.8 percent of the prime time shows it broadcasted,
but gained syndication rights to 79.5 percent of the programs carried on prime time. Viacom
Int'l Inc. v. Tandem Productions, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1264, 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
45. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(j)(1)(ii) (1972). The "financial interest rule" states
(j) . . . no television network shall:
(ii) After August 1, 1972, acquire any financial or proprietary right
or interest in the exhibition, distribution, or other commercial use of
any television program produced wholly or in part by a person other
than such television network, except the license or other exclusive
right to network exhibition within the United States and on foreign
stations regularly included within such television network. ...
46. Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc. v. F.C.C., 442 F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1971).
47. Had the rule's original date of May 4, 1970 not been stayed, CBS would have been
precluded from acquiring the distribution and syndication rights under the contract formed
July 10, 1970.
48. Relying on a binding oral agreement and believing all material elements had been
negotiated, Tandem moved into CBS's offices and began production. No right to assign had
been reserved, therefore Tandem had the right to assume that all syndication and distribution
would be performed by CBS or its subsidiary, CBS Enterprises, which normally handled
distribution. When CBS presented a draft of the agreement which contained a right of
assignment clause, Tandem made numerous objections, but CBS did not relent. Tandem,
having begun work on the show and having no other access to prime time, was forced to
[Vol. 30:1053
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coercion, but as a reason for dismissing the antitrust defense. Find-
ing that Viacom was an independent assignee, the court suggested
that the antitrust violation "may be vindicated in a separate action
.... where . . . the alleged wrongdoer under the antitrust laws is
not a party to the contract in dispute."49
The court in Viacom gave short shrift to the coercions inherent
in the tying arrangement and the assignment, but implied that the
defense could be considered if the plaintiff were CBS,5" the original
party to the contract, since Tandem's rights to distribute were
eliminated by CBS's tying arrangement-the first coercion. In find-
ing that upon an assignment-the second coercion-Tandem would
be unjustly enriched if the defense were upheld, the decision in
Viacom, in a sense is saying, two wrongs make a right. In other
words, a forced assignment will relieve an illegal tying arrangement.
The court of appeals has ignored the fact that Tandem will still be
the victim of monopoly power, required to carry out an executory
contract with an assignee to which it has objected.
Judge Lumbard, articulating the necessary elements to prove
an illegal tying arrangement,5 attempted to justify the court's anal-
ysis of unjust enrichment by placing unprecedented emphasis on
the policy of keeping simple contract actions simple." Citing
Dickstein v. duPont,53 Judge Lumbard reasoned that, "'such defen-
ses would tend to prolong and complicate contract disputes' and
thus convert a facially simple litigation into one involving the com-
plexities of antitrust law."54
However, the argument that the antitrust defense will prolong
and complicate the litigation is unpersuasive. In all cases where the
succumb. Viacom Int'l Inc. v. Tandem Productions, Inc. 368 F. Supp. 1264, 1270-75
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
49. 526 F.2d at 598.
50. Id. at 600.
51. Id. at 599-600. Coniglio v. Highwood Servs., Inc., 495 F.2d 1286, 1289 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1022 (1974) delineated the essential elements: (1) two separate and distinct
products; (2) sufficient economic power in the tying market to coerce the purchase of the tied
product; (3) anti-competitive effects in the tied market; and (4) involvement of a substantial
amount of interstate commerce in the tied market. These factors were analyzed to determine
whether the owners' of the Buffalo Bills policy of conditioning the purchase of season tickets,
to a requirement to buy exhibition game tickets, constituted an illegal tying arrangement.
52. This policy consideration has never been expressly relied upon by any Supreme Court
decision.
53. 443 F.2d 783 (1st Cir. 1971).
54. 526 F.2d at 599.
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defense has been upheld, the violation was "apparently susceptible
to ready proof."55 Furthermore, where the antitrust issue would tend
to complicate, etc., the financial burden upon the defendant to
prove the defense would be prohibitive in relation to the benefit
derived. 6 It should also be noted that the policy of the federal rules
favors resolving all disputes between the parties in a single litiga-
tion."
The court of appeals assumes that toleration of the antitrust
defenses would provide the defendant with his own coercive
weapon-the ability to threaten plaintiffs with lengthy and expen-
sive litigation, forcing plaintiff to forego prosecution or make an
unsatisfactory settlement. This last consideration appears to have
convinced the court that the balance of the equities lay with the
plaintiff. Therefore, "rather than force Viacom to meet the vagaries
of an antitrust defense action," 9 the court dismissed Tandem's
antitrust defense.
The Viacom decision is unique in its extension of the considera-
tion of whether to sustain the defense to a situation where the plain-
tiff is not an original party to the contract. The weight placed by
the court on the policy of keeping contract actions simple, suggests
that the burden of proving that one will derive no unjust enrichment
from a recognition of the antitrust defense, may be a nearly impossi-
ble burden to sustain, thereby depriving the defendant of an equita-
ble result.
The court of appeals' recognition and forthright consideration
of the actual policy issues at hand is laudable. In fact, Viacom may
have eliminated the artificial classifications which have been arbi-
trarily applied by the courts. Having taken this first step towards a
realistic and equitable approach to the consideration of an antitrust
defense in a breach of contract action, the court has come up shy.
It has failed to take the logical second step and proffer a remedy
55. Lockhart, supra note 15 at 573. "IT]he importance of this factor can easily be
exaggerated,"
56. Id. at 574.
57. FED. R. Civ. P. 13.
58. 526 F.2d at 599. Contra, Gutor Int'l A.G. v. Raymond Packer Co., Inc., 493 F.2d 938
(1st Cir. 1974). The court considered whether the interposition of an antitrust counterclaim
would make for a credible threat to the plaintiff. The court reasoned that since defendant
could threaten an independent action, an opportunity to bring the counterclaim did not
increase the severity of the threat.
59. 526 F.2d at 600.
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satisfactory and equitable to all the parties-restitution to Viacom
at a fair price for any services performed and non-enforcement of
any executory portions of the contract."0
Restitution would not give rise to unjust enrichment, nor com-
plicate the action, yet it would restore Viacom to its original posi-
tion, suffering no more than a loss of anticipated profits. Such a
resolution may serve to negate the anticompetitive abuses incurred
by Tandem and simultaneously maintain the integrity of the anti-
trust laws.
MARC L. FAUST
Sentencing Upon Revocation of Probation in
Florida
The Supreme Court of Florida held that a trial court is free
to impose any sentence upon revocation of probation which it
might have originally imposed despite the fact that the trial court
had originally imposed a lesser sentence. In so doing, the court
overruled the overwhelming weight of authority exhibited by the
lower appellate courts. The author suggests that the defendant's
constitutional protection against being twice placed in jeopardy
for the same offense and his right to counsel may have been
infringed upon in the process.
The defendant pleaded guilty to possession of heroin, issuing a
worthless check, and issuing a forged instrument. The trial judge
found the defendant guilty and sentenced him to a term of impris-
onment of 1 year in the county jail for each offense, to be followed
by 5 years probation. All sentences were to be served concurrently.
Thereafter, the trial court amended each of the sentences by reduc-
ing the period to be spent in the county jail to the 85 days then
served, and by suspending the execution of the remainder of the jail
sentences; but the court retained the 5 year probationary period.
The defendant subsequently violated his probation by committing
60. See Comment, The Defense of Antitrust Illegality in Contract Actions, 27 U. CI. L.
REv. 758, 776 (1960).
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